Racial Diversity in Private Equity Fundraising

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 - Ownership of financial institutions, particularly private capital groups, is an important driver of wealth (Smith et al. (2019))
 - Contributes to disparities of wealth by race (Chetty et al. (2019))

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 - Contributes to disparities of wealth by race (Chetty et al. (2019))
 - Homophily in private capital markets (Ewens and Townsend (2020); Gompers et al. (2017))
 - Disparities in racial ownership may have substantial effects on what types of entrepreneurs get funded

To what extent do supply/demand factors explain this ownership gap

Our goal is a level of diversity in investment management firms that reflects the diversity in the world in which we live. As a starting point, I would like to emphasize the importance of entry-level positions. ... You will note that we are not asking about firm ownership as a factor in measuring diversity. Ownership per se does not necessarily relate to having a diverse investment team.

While the systematic exclusion of people of color and women from the management of endowment assets has been a question of social justice over time, today it is for me a question of fiduciary responsibility. ... Study after study shows very high performing women and people of color, yet those same studies show under-utilization by asset allocators.

David Swensen, October 2020

Rev. Al Sharpton, April 2020


What is/explains minority ownership in private equity?

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What is/explains minority ownership in private equity?

- We begin by demonstrating five key facts:
 - 1 Black and Hispanic-owned groups (minority groups) represent a very modest share of the private capital pool
 - 2 Minority groups raise smaller first-time funds
 - 3 Mixed evidence of performance
 - 4 Fundraising success of minority groups is more sensitive to performance
 - Particularly on the downside
 - **5** Minority groups are more likely to raise funds in periods of high racial awareness

We argue that limited representation of Black- and Hispanic-owned private capital firms stems at least partially from LP demand



Data

Burgiss: Data on 2,881 funds from investors in larger and more established funds (Brown et al. (2015))

- Burgiss sample:
 - 2,881 US funds, vintage 2000 or later 40 minority owned
 - 22,059 deals, of which 10,815 exited 257 by minority owned funds
- For fundraising analysis, construct a sample at the fund-quarter level:
 - A fund is included until the quarter in which a follow-on fund is raised, 10 years has passed since its inception, or Q2 2021
 - We compute intermediate Public Market Equivalents (Kaplan and Schoar (2005)) at the beginning of every fund-quarter
- For performance analysis, use deal-level data as of Q2 2021
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- We use PitchBook (larger sample) to confirm results from Burgiss and Form D for first-time group fundraising

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- 2 UpWorkers review each group's website twice to flag groups with suspected Blacks or Hispanics on team page
- 3 We additionally flag groups classified as minority-owned by Crunchbase, Preqin, pension funds, consultants, LPs, or media accounts
- 4 Authors verify ethnicity of partners and founders for each flagged group, using
 - Skin color or attendance at a HBCU (Blacks only)
 - 2 Last name commonly associated with Hispanics (Census (2010))
 - **3** Affinity groups in LinkedIn or news reports


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- **5** A group is minority-owned if at least 50% of the founders or senior partners are Black or Hispanic (Ivashina and Lerner (2019) show that these senior members hold biggest ownership shares)



Few minority funds on a number (1.7%) and size-weighted basis (3.1%)



To what extent do minority groups struggle to enter the private equity industry?

Outcome_f =
$$\beta_1$$
 Minority Owned_f
+ Ψ Controls_f + λ_t + α_s + ϵ_f

Controls: Gender, Ln(# Executives), indicators for VC fund (buyout omitted), and Ln(Age = Years since group formation)

Outcomes: Percent Raised, Ln(Funding Raised), Ln(# Investors), I(Used Broker)

We can use Form D to fix amount the fund is looking to raise (1863 Venture Fund I)

Total Offering Amount \$20,000,000 USD or Indefinite

Total Amount Sold \$2,100,000 USD

Total Remaining to be Sold \$17,900,000 USD or Indefinite $Percent \ Raised = \frac{Total \ Amount \ Sold}{Total \ Offering \ Amount}$

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Minority groups struggle to raise first-time funds (Form D)

	Percent Raised	Ln(Funding Raised)	Ln(# Investors)	I(Used Broker)
Minority Owned	-21.375***	-0.702***	-0.572**	-0.057**
	(6.657)	(0.266)	(0.268)	(0.027)
Observations	541	541	541	541
Adjusted R ²	0.061	0.036	0.060	0.038
Year FE?	Χ	Χ	X	Χ
State FE?	Χ	Χ	X	Χ

Founders of minority-groups are similar to founders of non-minority groups (same sample)

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		Min Ow		
	Venture Capital Fund	0.038* (0.023)	0.038* (0.023)	
	Frac. Emp Grad	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.004 (0.045)	
	Frac. Emp Top 50	-0.064 (0.051)	-0.063 (0.054)	
	Frac. Emp Sup	0.072 (0.063)	0.073 (0.064)	
	Frac. Emp PE	-0.007 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.036)	
	Ln(Executives)	-0.002 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.022)	
	Ln(Experience)	-1.788 (2.599)	-1.755 (2.688)	
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For the minority groups that raise a fund, we find mixed evidence on performance

	All Deals		All Deals Exited Deals			ls	Non-Exited Deals		
Minority owned	-0.371***	-0.366***	-0.460***	0.027	0.155	-0.154	-0.543***	-0.588***	-0.562***
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.098)	(0.290)	(0.315)	(0.311)	(0.189)	(0.166)	(0.110)
Observations	22,059	22,059	20,954	10,815	10,815	10,576	11,244	11,244	10,378
Adjusted R ²	0.015	0.018	0.021	0.006	0.015	0.028	0.031	0.035	0.033
Controls?			X			X			Χ
Deal Year FE?	X	X	X	Х	Χ	Χ	X	X	Χ
Group State FE?		X	X		X	X		X	X

Why is minority-group performance lower for non-exited deals?

- 1 Non-exited deals are lower-quality investments
- 2 Minority group owners are more conservative more likely to hold investments at cost
- 3 Non-exited minority deals have had less time to mature more likely to be recent deals

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Minority groups are more likely to hold non-exited deals at cost

Dependent Variable:	I(Deal TVPI= 1) Non-Exited Deals					
Minority owned	0.351 (0.508)	0.240 (0.453)	0.382** (0.187)	0.344 (0.479)	0.247 (0.425)	0.393** (0.182)
(log) Time Since Investment	-1.288*** (0.114)	-1.341*** (0.086)	-1.363*** (0.065)			
Observations Pseudo R^2 Controls?	10,698 0.243	10,627 0.284	10,308 0.330 X	11,227 0.298	11,153 0.335	10,291 0.332 X
Deal Year FE? Group State FE?		×	X	X	Х	X X

To what extent does inflow-performance differ by minority-group ownership?

$$\begin{split} \text{I(Raised a follow-on fund)}_{\textit{fgq}} = & \beta_1 \text{PME}_{\textit{fg}(q-1)} \times \text{Minority Owned}_g \\ & + \beta_2 \text{PME}_{\textit{fg}(q-1)} + \beta_3 \text{Minority Owned}_g \\ & + \Psi \textit{Controls}_{\textit{fgq}} + \lambda_q + \alpha_s + \varepsilon_{\textit{fgq}} \end{split}$$

Controls: Log fund sequence, first-time fund indicator, indicators for buyout and VC fund (growth omitted). We cluster standard errors by investment group


Inflow-performance sensitivity higher for minority groups

Dependent Variable:	I(Raised a follow-on fund)			
PME × Minority Owned	0.745**	0.809***	0.677**	
	(0.292)	(0.294)	(0.270)	
PME	0.877***	0.862***	0.904***	
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.066)	
Minority Owned	0.384*	0.419***	0.426***	
	(0.197)	(0.147)	(0.155)	

Sensitivity is concentrated within low-performing minority groups

Dependent Variable:	I(Raised a follow-on fund)			
$PME \times Minority \ Owned \times High$	-0.010	0.166	-0.063	
	(0.665)	(0.518)	(0.691)	
$PME \times High$	0.165*	0.159*	0.266***	
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.092)	
$PME \times Minority Owned \times Low$	1.847***	1.861***	1.919***	
	(0.193)	(0.191)	(0.183)	
$PME \times Low$	1.847***	1.861***	1.919***	
	(0.193)	(0.191)	(0.183)	

LPs appear more likely to punish low performance by minority groups



Disparate treatment of minority groups likely contributes to low minority ownership

- Investors appear less willing to tolerate failure of minority groups compared with non-minority groups
 - Terminate funding relationships with poor performing minority groups
 - Minority groups may thus exit industry during periods of low returns
- Interviews with industry practitioners corroborate this explanation
- Evidence from other academic studies is also consistent gender (Niessen-Ruenzi et al. (2018)) and foreigners (Alok Kumar et al. (2015)) in the mutual fund industry

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- So we follow the sociology literature and use crowd-sourced data on fatal encounters between citizens and the police to proxy for racial awareness at a state level

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- So we follow the sociology literature and use crowd-sourced data on fatal encounters between citizens and the police to proxy for racial awareness at a state level
- Identify 4600 fatal encounters between police and unarmed Black or Hispanic civilians between 2000 and 2020
- Weight by news stories in Lexis-Nexis
 - A case is mentioned in an average of 13.4 articles, but 66.3% have no coverage at all

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Here are the top 10 fatal encounters by newspaper coverage

	Date	Number of Articles	Ethnicity	Age	Gender
Name			•		
George Floyd	May 25, 2020	37026	Black	46	M
Michael Brown	Aug 09, 2014	5937	Black	18	М
Daunte Wright	Apr 11, 2021	3144	Black	20	M
Walter Scott	Apr 04, 2015	1342	Black	50	M
Terence Crutcher	Sep 16, 2016	867	Black	40	М
Stephon Clark	Mar 18, 2018	828	Black	23	М
Jamar Clark	Nov 15, 2015	796	Black	24	М
Eric Garner	Jul 17, 2014	622	Black	43	М
Tony Robinson	Mar 06, 2015	451	Black	19	М
Atatiana Jefferson	Oct 12, 2019	387	Black	28	F

Fundraising likelihood higher during HRA periods

Dependent Variable:	I(Raised a follow-on fund)		
	0.671***	0.676***	0.701***
	(0.230)	(0.198)	(0.189)
Minority Owned	-0.193	-0.182	-0.192
	(0.306)	(0.255)	(0.236)
HRA	-0.051	-0.085	-0.098
	0.001	-0.001	-0.001

Conclusion: Limited representation of minority groups partially stems from investor demand

- What is/explains minority-ownership in private equity?
 - Minority-groups represent 1.7% of all private capital groups 3.1% on a size-weighted basis
 - Minority-groups struggle to enter the private equity industry even though they appear to have similar characteristics
 - LP intolerance of poor-performing minority groups might lead these groups to exit industry during periods of low returns
- Consistent with demand driven explanation, LP behavior changes around periods of high racial awareness

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Conclusion: Limited representation of minority groups partially stems from investor demand

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Work in progress:

- To what extent do minority public pension fund CIOs improve minority-group fundraising?
- To what extent do minority groups fund minority founders?

Thanks for your attention!