Are Creators Better Investors than Managers? Evidence from First-time Venture Funds

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What drives cross-sectional variation in individual partner performance?

- We focus on first-time funds to isolate individual partner characteristics from the group
- Are (Why are) first-time founders with prior VC or operating experience more likely to be successful?

Where do first-time VC firm founders come from?

Founders with VC background come from connected groups

Dependent Variable:		I(Spawne	ed new VC)	
Eigen Centrality	0.071*** (0.004)		0.056*** (0.004)	
Degree Centrality		0.331*** (0.023)		0.257*** (0.022)
нні			0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Ln(Fund Size)			0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Ln(Fund Age)			-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.003)
Ln(Last three years mergers)			0.024*** (0.004)	0.031*** (0.004)
Ln(Last three years ipos)			0.013*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)

Startup founders were also funded by connected VCs

Dependent Variable:		I(Spawne	d new VC)	
Eigen Centrality	0.099*** (0.011)		0.075*** (0.011)	
Degree Centrality		0.057*** (0.008)		0.041*** (0.008)
Ln(Funding Raised)			0.095*** (0.012)	0.106*** (0.013)
Ln(Firm Age)			0.009 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
I(Acquired)			0.086*** (0.017)	0.082*** (0.017)
I(IPO)			0.037 (0.037)	0.039 (0.037)

What type of VC would we expect to perform better?

VC founders have networks, startup founders walked the walk


- Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan, Strebulaev (2020): **Deal sourcing, Deal Selection, Post-investment monitoring**
 - Founders with past VC experience could have better networks to source deals
 - Founders with past operating experience could have better intuition for selecting deals and adding value post-investment (better rapport with founders)

First-time funds have written the first check for well-known firms

Here are the most recent 100 largest VC-backed IPOs




First-time funds wrote 1 in 4 first checks, 800 billion market cap






Here are the most recent 100 largest VC-backed flops



First-time funds wrote 1 in 6 first checks





Empirical Strategy

Is venture fund founder background related to performance?


$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Performance}_f &= \alpha \ + \beta_1 \text{VC exp}_f \\ &+ \beta_2 \text{Operating exp}_f \\ &+ \beta_3 \text{VC exp}_f \times \text{Operating exp}_f \\ &+ \text{Controls}_f \\ &+ \gamma_t \ + \varepsilon_{\textit{stj}} \end{aligned}$$

Controls: Female, Black/Hispanic, MBA, Ph.D., Arts Degree, Foreign University, Top 20 University, Ln(Fund size), Vintage Year F.E. (N = 354)

Our list of first-time VC funds is from PitchBook (2006 to 2017)

- **1** Founding year is within three years of vintage year
- 2 Keep founders of the firm
- **3** RAs verify group website to ensure we have all founders
- 4 Collect work experience, education history, and other characteristics of founders
- 5 For each company in work history, classify as VC, startup, or Other
- 6 Check for operating status of each portfolio company by:
 - ① Does company's website still work?
 - 2 Did company exit?
 - **3** Can we find article confirming bankruptcy or closure?
- Our final sample comprises 354 first-time funds with background information on all founders

Our sample comprises 354 first-time funds (2007 to 2018 vintages)



The median fund raises \$25 million and invests in 15 deals

N	Mean	Std Dev.	25%	50%	75%
354	66.38				
354	38.70				
354	22.03				
354	16.95				
354	79.10				
354	27.48	26.21	0.00	25.00	45.45
354	64.70	98.49	10.00	25.00	68.00
354	20.59	21.75	8.00	15.00	27.00
	354 354 354 354 354 354	354 66.38 354 38.70 354 22.03 354 16.95 354 79.10 354 27.48 354 64.70	N Mean Dev. 354 66.38 354 38.70 354 22.03 354 16.95 354 79.10 354 27.48 26.21 354 64.70 98.49	N Mean Dev. 25% 354 66.38 354 38.70 354 22.03 354 16.95 354 79.10 354 27.48 26.21 0.00 354 64.70 98.49 10.00	N Mean Dev. 25% 50% 354 66.38 354 38.70 <

What type of experience predicts fund performance?

Fraction of exits is a reasonable proxy for performance

Dependent Variable:	Distributions to Paid In Capital				
% IPO or MA	0.066*** (0.016)				
% IPO	0.042*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.014)			
% MA	0.046*** (0.017)	0.043*** (0.016)			
% Failures	-0.061***	-0.058***			

(0.016)

(0.016)

Unconditional exit rate: One in four deals

Dependent Variable:		(IPO or M& All Deals	A)*100	
VC exp	12.049*** (3.200)		8.537** (3.484)	9.643** (4.316)
Operating exp		-5.950* (3.462)	-4.581 (3.399)	-3.009 (4.593)
VC exp \times Operating exp				-2.470 (6.308)
Vintage Year FE?	Χ	Х	Х	Х

15/32

Experienced first-time founders are more likely to start follow-on funds

Dependent Variable:	I(Start follow-on fund)				
VC exp	16.914***	16.593***	20.270***		
	(4.978)	(5.222)	(7.095)		

-1.278

	(4.556)
VC exp $ imes$ Operating exp	

0.701 (4.604)

(7.095) 5.926 (8.557) -8.213 (10.098)

Operating exp

What explains the association between VC experience and performance?

Potential mechanisms for VC experience-performance relationship

Mechanism One: Risk

Founders with venture capital experience make riskier investments

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Mechanism Two: Superior skill

Founders with venture capital experience are better at deal sourcing, selection, and post-investment value-add

Potential mechanisms for VC experience-performance relationship

Mechanism One: Risk

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Mechanism Two: Superior skill

Founders with venture capital experience are better at deal sourcing, selection, and post-investment value-add

Mechanism Three: Leveraging Connections

Founders with VC experience leverage their connections to access better deals

Mechanism One: Risk – Are failures also more likely for founders with VC experience?

Assumption: risk implies quicker realizations of successes and failures

			Std			
	N	Mean	Dev.	25%	50%	75%
Fraction Failures (%)	354	9.82	14.60	0.00	0.00	16.67
Fraction Operating (%)	354	62.68	29.69	40.00	66.66	88.88
Fraction IPO/MA (%)	354	27.48	26.21	0.00	25.00	45.45

Unconditional failure rate: One in ten deals

Dependent Variable:	(Closed All Deals)*100				
VC exp	-2.282		-1.817	-1.042	
	(2.189)		(2.287)	(2.875)	
Operating exp		-1.195	-1.361	-0.260	
		(2.137)	(2.100)	(3.805)	

1 Closed 14400

-1.731

(4.633)

19/32

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Mechanism Two: Superior skill – Are deals led by founders with VC experience also more successful?

Leading deals that are successful wins you awards

Founding Partner, Geodesic Capital



Previously a partner at Andreessen Horowitz, where he focused on late-stage investing,

Bachireddy launched Geodesic Capital in 2015 with the goal of supporting the expansion of
technology companies into global markets, particularly those in Asia. Since the launch, Bachireddy
has put together a string of hit software investments including Confluent, Databricks, HashiCorp,
Marqeta, Netskope, Pendo, Snyk Thoughtspot and UiPath. Exits of note have included Airbnb and
JFrog.

Founders with VC background lead fewer deals

Dependent variable:	All Deals / All Deals				
VC exp	-6.058**		-7.562***	-8.883**	
	(2.619)		(2.741)	(3.855)	
Operating exp		3.545	2.916	1.045	
		(2.358)	(2.395)	(4 521)	

(Deals Led)*100

Dependent Variable

 $VC \exp \times Operating \exp$


2.944 (5.280)

Founders with VC background are not more successful on deals led


Dependent Variable:	$(\frac{IPO \text{ or } M\&A \text{ (Led)}}{All \text{ Deals Led}})*100$					
VC exp	4.816 (3.843)		2.648 (4.160)	2.704 (5.510)		
Operating exp		-5.866 (3.895)	-5.133 (4.074)	-5.053 (6.141)		
$VC \exp \times Operating \exp$				-0.126 (7.783)		

Mechanism Three: Leveraging Connections – Do founders with VC experience join successful syndicates?


Degree and EigenVector centrality capture related, but different things



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Centrality of coinvestors is positively associated with success





Founders from VC join connected syndicates

Dependent Variable:	EigenVector Centrality				
VC exp	0.257** (0.116)		0.201* (0.111)	0.312** (0.155)	
Operating exp		-0.148 (0.108)	-0.111 (0.104)	0.046 (0.182)	
$VC \exp \times Operating \exp$				-0.248 (0.225)	

Is founder background related to fundraising?

New managers from the VC world raise larger funds

Dependent Variable:	Ln(Fund Size)				
VC exp	0.231*** (0.085)		0.228** (0.093)	0.231** (0.093)	
Operating exp		-0.102 (0.082)	-0.022 (0.088)	-0.006 (0.092)	
$VC \exp \times Operating \exp$				0.036 (0.075)	


Founders with VC experience leverage networks to outperform

- What drives cross-sectional variation in individual partner performance?
- Experience preceding fund formation is related to performance: Partners with VC experience outperform partners with startup experience:
 - 1 Not by taking more risk
 - OR selecting better deals
 - 3 By joining successful syndicates
- Founders with VC experience come from:
 - Connected funds
 - Concentrated investments
 - Recent exits


Past experience of founding GPs is related to performance

- Founder Attributes ⇒ Performance (Zarutskie (2010), Dimov et al. (2007), Cai et al. (2012), Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015))
 - By focusing on first-time funds, we can separate firm from founder attributes
 - We also discuss mechanisms, focusing on connections
- Networks ⇒ Performance (Hsu (2004), Hochberg et al. (2007))
 - Networks are driven by past employment in VC
 - Networks are related to VC spawning
- Venture Spawning (Gompers et al. (2005), Hochberg et al. (2010))
 - Which operating and venture firms spawn VCs?
 - Networks can positively affect success of new entrants
- What factors drive cross-sectional variation in performance? (Kaplan and Schoar (2005); Kaplan et al. (2012); Cohen et al. (2008); Chevalier and Ellison (2003))
 - Founder background


Which VCs benefit/hurt by the number of accelerators/incubators?



Which VCs benefit/hurt by increasing number of unicorns?



Especially when funding each unicorn requires a lot of capital





Thanks for your comments!

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